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From a Belgian point of view, even after the deepest reform the Senate has known
(2011-2014), the issue of the Senate reform has never really been bicameralism per
se. When political parties talked about Senate reform they had less bicameralism
as such in mind but saving public expenditures. That being said, we may not totally
reject an attempt to reduce the federal character of the country. Indeed, we may
hypothesise that some political parties try to target a symbol of the – still young –
Belgian federal organisation.
In a federative system, the second chamber usually represents the States while the
first chamber represents the people of the country (with only few exceptions to the
rule). Therefore not only the composition but also – especially – the designation
system has to be different. That is almost the only way to ensure a different
composition. Since the 6th State Reform (i.e. a major reform of the Constitution
and new constitutional laws), implemented since July 2014, Belgian Senators are
not elected anymore, but designated for the main part (50/60) by the federated
entities or coopted (10/60) according the results of the Chamber’s election. This
arithmetical arrangement constitutes an element of a broader compromise (the
splitting of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde constituency). It allows taking into account
‘lost ballots’ (especially votes from French-speaking voters around Brussels to
French-speaking parties and that were insufficient to give right to a seat) and
therefore giving value to what could have been a pointless vote.
Of course, before raising the question of performing tasks, we should scrutinise their
types, their scope and their impact on policies. Regarding the Belgian case, since
the 6th State Reform the Senate’s competences have been considerably reduced.
The Senate has become a meeting place between the federal and the federated
authorities. That means that Senators have seen their legislative powers shrinking
and will from now on be mainly limited to further Constitutional reforms.
Within this framework, to perform its new tasks the new composition of the Senate –
now different from the first chamber – should reinforce the legitimacy of its decisions
as, for the first time, the polities that benefit by the State reforms will be involved
in the further decision-making process. Of course in a partitocratic political system
like Belgium, this involvement is purely formal as the decision are the products of
a sophisticated compromise made between the political parties leaders, while the
parliamentary assemblies are strictly the place for official approbation more than a
debate forum.
With respect to federal systems, there are several models that are frequently
referred to. There is the US model (equal representation for each States regardless
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their size) or German one (representation according to the size of the Land).
Belgium has chosen a proportional solution close to the German system, with the
difficulty that the constituent assembly had to decide which type of entity would
be represented in the new Senate, as the Belgian federal system is made of two
types of federated entities that overlap: Regions and Communities. Finally, the
compromise provides the following balance:
• 29 Senators from the Flemish[1] Parliament (or from the Dutch-speaking group
in the Brussels Parliament), but at least one should live in Brussels;
• 10 Senators from the French-speaking Community Parliament (7 living in
Wallonia and 3 living in Brussels);
• 8 Senators from the Walloon Parliament (besides they are also ex-officio
members of the French-speaking Community Parliament);
• 2 Senators from the French-speaking group in the Brussels Parliament
• 1 Senator from the German-speaking Community.
This distribution matches closely the current linguistic distribution (although official
figures do not exist). However, most decisions in the Senate need a special
majority to be adopted. The new Belgian Senate’s remit does actually cover mainly
constitutional changes (2/3 majority needed) or special laws (2/3 majority + majority
in each linguistic group). Besides, a State’s reform requires the adoption of the same
text in the House of Representatives too.
Until now, the new Senate has not held any meeting except to validate its
composition after the election and to designate its chairwoman. It is supposed to
be a non-permanent assembly, meeting from time to time. We should nevertheless
stress the absence of a true federal culture and, above all, a strong party discipline in
Belgium. That implies that the vote will less follow a federal logic and that Senators
will give maximum priority to the party’s instructions on their Community or Region’s
interests.
We do not have any return on experience so far as the new Senate has not had the
opportunity to deal with any case. But considering the role of the political parties
in Belgium, at a point that some describe the political system as partitocratic, we
may be doubtful as to the benefits of a second chamber. Of course, it allows more
democratic control or decisions (as far as they are bicameral decisions) which is
invaluable. However as every law is strictly reviewed (if not written) by the parties’
leaders, the benefits of a second chamber are very limited.
Governement’s stability is a key – if not the major issue – of the decision-making
process. Bicameralism slows down any reform or even a standard legislative
process. In a highly fragmented political landscape like Belgium, safeguards
are always appreciated. Bicameralism is also considered as characteristic of
consociative democracy, for this reason among others. From a consociative point
of view, bicameralism is clearly a way to share, to disperse and to limit power.
However, due to the imbalance between executive and legislative powers, a
bicameral process implies less cost than in a more ‘perfect’ parliamentary system
(representative democracy). In contemporary Belgium, the federal government
stability is ensured (or challenged) by the House of Representatives only; therefore
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bicameralism does not really impact the stability and does not imply any cost of such
nature.
The principle of majority rule is particularly hard to apply to a consociative model
like Belgium, quasi ontologically opposed to it. Used to large coalitions, the Belgian
political system does not content itself with a simple majority. On the contrary, the
minority enjoys de facto a veto right and the decision cannot be the product of a
simple majority. Safeguards block any attempt to play the law of large numbers.
For instance, the alarm bell process is a constitutional provision that allows the
Parliament to suspend any decision formed by a Community (majority) against the
other (minority).
On the other hand, despite the recent (2003) introduction of a 5% electoral threshold,
the fragmentation index is relatively high as a corollary of a PR system. The
composition of the delegation from the federated entities to the Senate follows the
D’Hondt formula and does not therefore limit proportionality. Besides doing that
would contravene the consensus model.
The slowness of the law-making process is compensated by a higher legitimacy
(more safeguards). Actually the costs are strictly controlled by the political parties
and framed by party discipline. The risk of discordant vote and instability (i.e. the true
costs) are therefore limited.
As far as Belgium is concerned, two situations could lead to change the cost-benefit
ratio. First, in the case of a higher instability, parties might want to increase their
leadership and to reduce bicameralism. However it seems difficult to limit the current
process without simply abolishing the Senate. Second, a reform could be considered
in case of an emancipation of the Senate, which would require for the federated
delegations to revolt against the parties positions. A more neutral (or federalist) way
to express this concern would be to evoke an imbalance between the representation
of the people and the representation of the States. However, that seems very
unlikely to happen, as the parties would go out of their way to keep both assemblies
under their control.
Some, and not only in Belgium, find bicameralism generally in need of reform, which
might be partly explained by the general diagnosis of crisis of democracy or – as
Bernand Manin has shown – in the mutation of the parliamentary system. While
voters’ demands are ever more individual and fragmented, their individual influence
in a representative democracy dwindles and the link between him and his MP tends
to loosen. Besides the upper house is often seen as – at best – an assembly of the
wise men or as – at worst – an inefficient and expensive chamber of old men that
impedes the law-making process. Social media might have opened the path towards
other forms of democracy with more emphasis on discussion and participation.
Considering the safeguards that already exist in Belgium, I would say that a Senate
is neither desirable per se nor undesirable. The least we can do today in Belgium
is to let it prove its utility. But a priori the new Senate will not bring a renewing or
reinforcement of democracy while giving the voice to federated entities. Under
existing conditions and given the high partitocratic control of politics, an upper
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house has only few assets in a democratic perspective. Time has probably come to
introduce some degree of participatory democracy.
[1] The Flemish Region and the Flemish Communities have merged in the 1980s.
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